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ABSTRACT 
This study hypothesizes that the conflict of interest problem exists in the 
management-controlled firms. The problem does not exist in the owner-controlled firms. 
This study supports these hypotheses.  
The conflict of interest problem occurs in the management-controlled firms 
because managers tend to emphasize their wealth by increasing sales or profit but stock 
returns at the expense of shareholders’ wealth. Shareholders are more concerned with 
the increase of stock returns, which is related directly to their wealth. On the other 
hand, in the owner-controlled firms, since the managers are also the owners of the 
firms, the conflict of interest problem does not exist. 
The conflict of interest problem still persists even though CEOs have been 
compensated well. The problem cannot be solved by how much CEOs are paid, but by 
how they are paid. The problem can be reduced by designing compensation scheme that 
increases the ownership of the CEOs. This situation had already been recognized by the 
U.S. firms, that of the 374 firms in the sample, 80% or 300 firms are the owner-
controlled firms. 
Keywords: Compensation, conflict of interest, agency relationship. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper addresses the issue that even 
though executives have been compensated 
well, there is still a conflict of interest between 
CEOs and shareholders in the agent principal 
relationship. This problem occurs in the 
management-controlled firms. The problem 
occurs because in the management-controlled 
firms, CEOs, as the owners of the company, 
usually emphasize their own wealth at the 
expense of the shareholders’ wealth.  
The conflict of interest between a CEO as 
an agent and the shareholder as a principal 
occurs because they both have different 
objectives. Even though a CEO reports to the 
board of directors, who represent the share-
holders, the board is generally ineffective in 
monitoring the CEO's actions. Since the CEO's 
actions are not observable by the shareholders, 
a CEO must be compensated to take actions in 
the best interest of shareholders. Even though 
CEOs have been compensated well, if they are 
not the owners, the conflict of interest problem 
still exits. A CEO’s compensation seems to be 
controversial. For example, Thomas E. Frist, 
Jr., the CEO of HCA Hospital Corp., received 
compensation of $ 127,067,000.00 to make 
him the highest paid CEO in 1992. Overall, the 
800 CEOs in Forbes compensation survey 
received $ 2.1 billion in 1992. But that huge 
amount of money represents less than 1.2 % of 
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the $ 179 billion net profits of those 
companies. So, the question is not how much 
CEOs are paid, but how they are paid (Jensen 
and Murphy, 1990).  
CEOs may be tempted to maximize their 
own wealth rather than the shareholders' 
wealth. This situation is well described by 
Simon (1986) when he relates the comment of 
Ponderosa's shareholders: "Here's a company 
where management comes first, and the 
shareholders, if they come in at all, are away at 
the end of the cafeteria line."  
Some observers link this shareholders' 
problem with the way CEO compensation is 
tied to the sales volume or profit. If CEO 
compensation is tied to the sales volume or 
profit, CEOs will pay less attention to the 
performance of the firms’ stock returns. The 
conflict of interest exists because CEOs as 
managers will try to increase sales or profit to 
increase their compensations. Increasing sales 
or profit is not necessarily increasing 
shareholders’ wealth, since sales and profit can 
be manipulated for the benefit of the managers 
at the expense of the shareholders. The wealth 
of the shareholders is related to the increase of 
the firms’ stock prices, since stock prices 
determine the gain that shareholders would 
receive if they sold their shares. 
The conflict of interest problem is severe 
for the management-controlled firms which 
their CEOs are only hired managers. The 
problem does not exist for the owner-
controlled firms, as their CEOs are the 
shareholders of the firms. Therefore, the 
objectives of this paper is to examine whether 
the conflict of interest between managers and 
shareholders exists for management-controlled 
firms and does not exist for the owner-
controlled firms. The conflict is shown by the 
way managers concentrate on the sales or 
profit rather than on stock returns to increase 
their compensations. 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND 
HYPOTHESES 
The first research on CEO compensation 
was conducted by Roberts (1959). Using a 
sample of 1,414 firms for period of 1935-1950, 
he found that sales volume was related to CEO 
compensation. A following study using 45 
firms of 1953-1959 period by McGuire, Chiu 
and Elbing (1963) supported Robert's finding 
that sales volume was related to CEO 
compensation. 
Later research found that there was a 
stronger correlation between profit and CEO 
compensation than that with sales volume. 
Lewellen and Hunstman's (1970) study invol-
ving 50 firms from 1942 to 1963 concluded 
that profit was related to CEO compensation 
and that size (sales volume) had no effect. 
Prasad (1974) conducted research on a group 
of managers rather than a single individual 
CEO and his findings also suggested that profit 
was a better predictor of managers compen-
sation. 
A study by Murphy (1985) for example, 
involving the 73 largest U.S. manufacturing 
firms from the period of 1964 to 1981 reported 
that shareholder return (measured by stock 
return) was positively related to executive 
compensation. The next study by Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) using 1,295 companies from 
1974 to 1986 supported this notion that 
shareholder wealth was positively related to 
CEO compensation. 
The study by Wallace (1973) found that 
profit was a better predictor for executive 
compensation in owner-controlled firms where 
operated in low-concentrated industries. 
Another similar study was conducted by 
Gomez-Mejia, Tosi and Hinkin (1987), 
involving seventy one CEOs in manufacturing 
firms, found that corporate performance (profit 
and stock return) were better predictors of 
CEO compensation for owner-controlled firms 
and size was found to be a main determinant of 
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CEO compensation for management-controlled 
firms. 
Increasing sales volume or profit is easier 
than increasing stock returns. Increasing sales 
volume or profit does not always mean 
increasing the wealth of the shareholders, 
because managers can manipulate those 
numbers by using accounting methods. But 
increasing stock returns does increase the 
wealth of the shareholders. Since CEOs in 
management-controlled firms are only hired 
managers not the owners of the firms, they 
tend to increase sales volume or profit to 
increase their own wealth rather than to 
increase stock returns. On the other hand, 
CEOs in the owner-controlled firms are the 
owner of the firm, so they are encouraged to 
increase their own wealth as well the 
shareholders’ wealth. CEOs in the owner-
controlled firms tend to increase not only sales 
or profit but also to increase stock returns. This 
leads to the alternative hypotheses as follows.  
 
H1 : In management-controlled firms, sales or 
profit rather than stock returns is more 
likely to be the primary determinant for 
CEO compensation. 
H2 :  In owner-controlled firms, sales, profit 
and stock return are more likely to be the 
primary determinant for CEO compen-
sation. 
EMPIRICAL SECTION 
Sample 
Data for this study were collected from 
several sources as follows. 
1. CEO compensation and firm performance 
data were obtained from the May 1993 
issue of Forbes Magazine. 
2. Firm asset data were taken from the 1993 
Special Bonus Issue of Business Week 
Magazine. 
Eight hundred CEOs were listed in the 
Forbes Executive Survey, the May 1993 issue 
of Forbes Magazine. Of the 800 observations, 
175 were disqualified because of unavailability 
of five years of compensation data. To 
eliminate sample selection bias that long-term 
compensation was really received by execu-
tives as CEOs, they must be in CEO positions 
at least for five years.1 One hundred forty six 
(146) observations were disqualified, because 
CEOs were in the firms for less than five years 
and 27 observations were also disqualified 
because long-term compensation covered less 
than five-year period. Ten observations were 
also dropped because average five year return 
data were not available. This reduces the 
sample taken from Forbes Magazine to 442 
observations. Because Forbes does not give 
firms’ assets data, these data were taken from 
the 1993 Special Bonus Issue of Business 
Week Magazine. Sixty-eight observations were 
again dropped because the companies were not 
listed in Business Week. The final sample 
consists of 374 observations. Table 1 presents 
this sample selection procedure. 
This study classified the data into two 
groups, one belonging to management-
controlled firms and another belonging to 
owner-controlled firms. Following Gomez-
Mejia, Tosi & Hinkin (1987), a firm in which 
the CEO owns or controls 4 percent or more of 
stocks is considered an owner-controlled firm, 
otherwise it is considered as a management-
controlled firm. From 374 observation, 74 
observations belong to management-controlled 
firm sample and 300 are for owner-controlled 
firm sample. 
                                                          
1 Previous studies did not consider the number of years 
that a CEO really holds a position as a CEO (not only as 
an executive). This study defines the CEO compensation 
as the total compensation, that is the sum of short- and 
long-term compensations. Since the long-term compen-
sation covers five year compensations, a CEO must have 
been a CEO for at least five years. For example, a CEO 
who has been employed in firms for seven years, but 
during the first four years his/her position was as an 
ordinary manager. Therefore, his/her five years compen-
sation does not really reflect long-term compensation for 
his/her performance as a CEO. Therefore, this study 
excluded all the data for executives who have been in a 
firm as CEOs for less than five years. Previous studies 
ignored this consideration. 
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Table 1. The Sample Selection Procedure. 
 
Number of CEOs listed in Forbes Survey 1993                800    
Incomplete data due to:                                       
  - compensation data not available          175          
  - covers less than five-year period              27          
  - CEO in a firm for less than 5 years              146           
  - Average five-year returns not available        10          
  Total incomplete data from Forbes                       356    
                                                           ---- -  
  Total number of sample obtained from Forbes              442    
  Asset data not available in Business Week                    68    
                                                           ---- -   
  Final sample                                             374 
 
 
Summary statistics describing selected 
characteristics of the sample under investi-
gation are presented in Table 2. The CEO's 
ages range from 37 to 80 years, with average 
of 58.47 years. The CEO's tenures range from 
5 to 57 years. On average, the CEOs had been 
employed by the firms for 26.54 years and as 
CEOs for 12.65 years. Ten percent of the 
CEOs have education less than undergraduate 
level. More CEOs hold undergraduate degree 
(42%) and master degree (37%). Ph.D. 
accounts for 11% for CEOs' degrees. 
The average compensation the CEOs 
receive is 10.776 million with the lowest paid 
as low as $50,000 and the highest as $122.994 
million.  
Not all the companies in the sample have 
positive average five-year returns and profits. 
The highest average five-year returns is 109% 
and the lowest is -17%. But, as an average for 
374 companies, this return is positive 
(18.23%). Companies' profits range from -
$2.059 billion to $4.725 billion with average 
profit of $244.47 million. The size of the 
companies, measured by their assets, range 
from $287 million to $213.701 billion, with an 
average size of $11 billion in assets.  
Pearson correlation coefficients for mana-
gement-controlled firms are presented in Table 
3 and those for owner-controlled firms are 
shown in Table 4. 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of the Sample (Number of observation is 374). 
 
Variable                     Mean         Minimum        Maximum 
AGE             58.47       37.00       80.00   
TENURE          26.54        5.00       57.00   
CEOYEAR      12.65        5.00       54.00   
COMP  10776.0 50.00 122994.00 
RETURN5         18.23      -17.00      109.00   
SALES         4920.15      174.00    64904.00   
PROFIT         244.47    -2059.00     4725.00   
ASSET        10936.00      287.00   213701.00   
EDUCATION: 
   HS          10.00%        -         -        
     UNDER       42.00%        -         -        
     MASTER      37.00%        -         -        
    PHD          11.00%        -          -        
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Table 3. Pearson Correlation Coefficients for the management-controlled firms (n=74). 
 
 COMP CEOYEAR TENURE SALES PROFIT RETURN5 
COMP 1.000 0.165 -0.049 0.552*** 0.418*** -0.073 
CEOYEAR  1.000 0.093 -0.018 -0.027 0.175 
TENURE   1.000 0.042 0.156 0.024 
SALES    1.000 0.696*** -0.246** 
PROFIT     1.000 0.195 
RETURN5      1.000 
Note: 
- *   Significant at the 10% level. 
- **   Significant at the 5% level. 
- *** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
Table 4. Pearson Correlation Coefficients for the owner-controlled firms (n=300) 
 
 COMP CEOYEAR TENURE SALES PROFIT RETURN5 
COMP 1.000 0.146** -0.081 0.178** 0.424*** 0.290*** 
CEOYEAR  1.000 0.404*** 0.022 0.060 0.106 
TENURE   1.000 0.040 0.000 -0.194*** 
SALES    1.000 0.295*** -0.092 
PROFIT     1.000 0.335*** 
RETURN5      1.000 
Note: 
- *  Significant at the 10% level. 
- **  Significant at the 5% level. 
- *** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
Empirical Models 
Tabel 3 shows that for the management-
controlled firms, SALES and PROFIT, SALES 
and RETURN5, are statistically significantly 
correlated. These suggest that to avoid multi-
collinearity problem, the regression models 
should separate these variables to become 
independent variables in the same regression 
model. The regression models for manage-
ment-controlled firms are thus as follows.  
COMPi = b1 + b2 CEOYEARi + b3 TENUREi 
                + b4 SALESi + ei                    (1) 
COMPi = b1 + b2 CEOYEARi + b3 TENUREi 
                + b4 PROFITi + ei                    (2) 
COMPi = b1 + b2 CEOYEARi + b3 TENUREi 
                 + b4 RETURN5i + ei                    (3) 
COMPi = b1 + b2 CEOYEARi +  
                 b3 TENUREi + b4 PROFIT +  
                 b5 RETURN5i + ei                    (4) 
 
For the owner-controlled firms, 
CEOYEAR and TENURE has a quite high 
correlation coefficient (0.404) and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This suggests that 
CEOYEAR and TENURE variables cannot 
appear as the independent variables in the 
same regression model, because by so doing 
will create multicollinearity problem in the 
regression. The correlation coefficients also 
show that SALES and PROFIT as well as 
PROFIT and RETURN5 are statistically signi-
ficantly correlated. These also suggest that the 
regression models should separate these 
variables to become independent variables in 
the same regression model. The regression 
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models for owner-controlled firms are thus as 
follows.  
COMPi =  b1 + b2 CEOYEARi + b3 SALESi + 
  ei                (5) 
COMPi = b1 + b2 TENUREi + b3 SALESi + 
   ei       (6) 
COMPi = b1 + b2 CEOYEARi + b3 PROFITi 
  + ei (7) 
COMPi = b1 + b2 TENUREi + b3 PROFITi  + 
  ei (8) 
COMPi = b1 + b2 CEOYEARi +  
  b3 RETURN5i  + ei (9) 
COMPi = b1 + b2 TENUREi + b3 RETURN5i  
  + ei (10) 
COMPi = b1 + b2 CEOYEARi + b3 SALESi + 
  b4 RETURN5i + ei         (11) 
COMPi = b1 + b2 TENUREi + b3 SALESi +  
  b4 RETURN5i + ei         (12) 
 
Variables used in the models are as follows.  
- COMP is the total compensation received 
by the CEO deflated by the total assets. 
COMP consists of realized and deferred 
annual salary and bonus received, five 
years salaries and bonuses, stock-gains and 
other. Stock-gains are the difference in 
value between what a CEO pays to acquire 
shares and the value of the shares on the 
date of exercise. Other compensation co-
vers miscellaneous cash and non-cash 
remunerations, including automobiles, 
company-paid health or life insurance, 
Country Club memberships, company 
contributions to savings plans and 
restricted stock award.  
- CEOYEAR is the number of years as a 
CEO in the same firm. This variable is used 
in the models as a control variable.  
- TENURE is the number of years the person 
is within the firm whether she/he as a CEO 
or not. 
- SALES is defined as a firm's sales volume 
for a full year. To eliminate the effect of a 
firm's size, this variable is deflated by 
firm's total assets. 
- PROFIT is defined as income before 
extraordinary items. To eliminate the effect 
of a firm's size, this variable is also deflated 
by firm's total assets. 
- RETURN5 is defined as five-years average 
of stock returns. 
RESULTS 
The regression results for management-
controlled firms appear in Table 5. 
 
The multicollinearity problem is checked 
using a condition number as suggested by 
Belsley et al. (1980). The condition number is 
calculated as the squared root of the largest 
eigenvalue divided by the smallest eigenvalue. 
The largest and smallest eigenvalues and the 
condition numbers are presented in Table 5. 
All of these condition numbers are below the 
critical values (20) of potential 
multicollinearity problem as suggested by 
Belsley et al. The results suggest that 
multicollinearity problem does not exist in all 
of the four regressions. 
Another data problem that needs to be 
verified is heteroscedasticity problem.2 The 
heteroscedasticity problem is tested using 
Breusch-Pagan method. Breusch and Pagan 
utilized Lagrange multiplier to test the 
presence of heteroscedasticity which allows 
                                                          
2 The problem of heteroscedasticity exists because the 
variance of the error term is not constant for all values of 
the independent variables. Even though this problem 
does not affect the unbiased estimators, it leads to 
inefficient estimates and thus makes the statistical tests 
incorrect. In this case, the problem of heteroscedasticity 
occurs because this study uses cross-section data. In 
cross-section data, large and small firms have a tendency 
to have different disturbance variances. Large firms tend 
to have large disturbance variance and small firms tend 
to have small disturbance variance. This situation makes 
the disturbance variance inconstant across observations. 
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the disturbance variance to vary with all 
independent variables. The values of this test 
are given in Table 5. The results suggest that 
all the regressions suffered by the 
heteroscedasticity problem. The problem was 
solved using White’s procedure and the 
corrected t-values are given in the parentheses 
in third line of each variable in Table 5. The 
values in the second line in the parentheses are 
t-values before corrected for heteroscedas-
ticity. 
 
Table 5. Management-controlled firm regressions (n=74). 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
INTERCEPT 0.01720
a)
 
(0.023)
b)
 
(0.018)
c)
 
0.8305 
(1.065) 
(0.958) 
1.2078 
(1.328) 
(0.9330 
1.2990 
(1.616) 
(1.085) 
CEOYEAR 0.1152 
(1.886)* 
(1.203) 
0.1192 
(1.792)* 
(1.153) 
0.1190 
(1.589) 
(1.048) 
0.1427 
(2.148)** 
(1.324) 
TENURE -0.1794 
(-0.913) 
(-0.926) 
-0.0273 
(-1.265) 
(-1.162) 
-0.0129 
(-0.543) 
(-0.506) 
-0.0284 
(-1.336) 
(-1.234) 
SALES 0.1388 
(5.770)*** 
(3.880)*** 
 
     - 
 
     - 
 
     - 
PROFIT  
     - 
0.0104 
(4.160)*** 
(5.011)*** 
 
     - 
0.1143 
(4.538)*** 
(4.914)*** 
RETURN5  
     - 
 
     - 
-0.0223 
(-0.885) 
(-0.506) 
-0.0434 
(-1.907)* 
(-1.166) 
R
2 
0.3436 0.2234 0.0422 0.2622 
F-value 12.217*** 6.713*** 1.027*** 6.133*** 
Largest Eigenvalue 3.361 3.091 3.622 3.879 
Smallest Eigenvalue 0.047 0.048 0.047 0.047 
Condition Number 8.406 7.971 8.791 9.113 
Critical value 20 20 20 20 
Df 3 3 3 4 
Breusch-Pagan 2 29.4406 37.0679 22.7558 44.8012 
Critical value of 2  7.82 7.82 7.82 9.49 
Note:  
The dependent variabel is COMP. 
a) Values in the first line are the regression coefficients. 
b) Values in parentheses in the second line are the t-tests before corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
c) Values in parentheses in the third line are the t-test after corrected for heteroskedasticity 
* significant at the 10% level. 
**  significant at the 5% level. 
*** significant at the 1% level. 
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The results from Table 5 show that SALES 
and PROFIT are statistically significant at the 
1% level and RETURN5 is insignificant. The 
results support the first hypothesis that in the 
management-controlled firms, CEO tend to 
focus on sales or profit but not on stock return 
to increase their wealth. 
The regression results for owner-controlled 
firms appear in Table 6. 
 
 
Table 6. Owner-controlled firm regressions (n=300). 
 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
INTERCEPT 0.7354a) 
(0.517)b) 
(0.585)c) 
5.7717 
(3.183)*** 
(3.826)*** 
-0.6073 
(-0.496) 
(-0.482) 
3.8552 
(2.362)** 
-0.6765 
(-0.482) 
(-0.323) 
2.1362 
(1.066) 
(0.982) 
-3.4060 
(-2.189)** 
(-1.443) 
-0.6211 
(-0.297) 
(-0.259) 
CEOYEAR 0.1952 
(2.522)** 
(1.990)** 
 
     - 
0.1666 
(2.332)** 
(1.771)* 
 
     - 
 
0.1604 
(2.113)** 
(1.823)* 
 
     - 
0.1513 
(2.036)** 
(1.775)* 
 
     - 
TENURE  
     - 
-0.0920 
(-1.559) 
(-2.055)** 
 
    - 
-0.0846 
(-8.097)*** 
(-2093)** 
 
     - 
-0.0269 
(-0.460) 
(-0.587) 
 
     - 
-0.0320 
(-0.577) 
(-0.725) 
SALES 0.0022 
(3.088)*** 
(4.418)*** 
0.0023 
(3.185)*** 
(4.189)*** 
 
     - 
 
     - 
 
     - 
 
     - 
0.0026 
(5.449)*** 
(4.521)*** 
0.0026 
(3.793)*** 
(4.339)*** 
PROFIT  
     - 
 
     - 
0.0738 
(7.984)*** 
(4.814)*** 
-0.7511 
(8.097)*** 
(4.842)*** 
 
     - 
 
     - 
 
     - 
 
     - 
RETURN5  
     - 
 
     - 
 
     - 
 
     - 
0.2174 
(5.009)*** 
(2.381)** 
0.2232 
(5.036)*** 
(2.320)** 
0.2326 
(5.449)*** 
(2.548)*** 
0.2374 
(5.455)*** 
(2.469)** 
R2 0.0519 0.0394 0.1944 0.1863 0.0977 0.0847 0.1383 0.1272 
F-value 8.128*** 6.097*** 35.830*** 33.993*** 16.075*** 13.753*** 15.841*** 14.378*** 
Largest Eigenvalue 2.502 2.584 
 
2.389 
 
 
2.450 
 
2.577 
 
2.608 0.454 
 
3.215 
 
 
Smallest Eigenvalue 0.127 0.007 
 
 
0.138 
 
0.007 
 
0.128 
 
0.059 0.110 
 
0.056 
 
Condition Number 4.432 5.964 
 
4.165 5.782 
 
4.485 
 
6.601 5.371 
 
7.539 
Critical value 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Df 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 
Breusch-Pagan 2 93.5261           24.6399      292.137 187.971 459.436 403.791 499.083 450.271 
Note:  
The dependent variabel is COMP. 
a) Values in the parentheses in the first line are the regression coefficients. 
b) Values in the parentheses in the second line are the t-tests before Corrected for Heteroskedasticity. 
c) Values in the third line are the t-test after Corrected for Heteroskedasticity 
* significant at the 10% level. 
**  significant at the 5% level. 
*** significant at the 1% level. 
 
 Jurnal Ekonomi dan Bisnis Indonesia Januari 
 
72 
The multicollinearity problem is again 
checked using a condition number as 
suggested by Belsley et al. (1980). All of these 
condition numbers are below 20, suggesting 
that the multicollinearity problem does not 
exist in all of the eight regressions. 
The heteroscedasticity problem is also 
tested again using Breusch-Pagan method. The 
results in Table 6 suggest that all the 
regressions suffered by the heteroscedasticity 
problem. The problem was solved using 
White’s procedure and the corrected t-values 
are given in the parentheses in the third line of 
each variable in Table 6. 
The results from Table 6 show that all the 
three performance measures, SALES, PROFIT 
and RETURN5, are all statistically significant 
at the 1% and 5% levels. The results support 
the second hypothesis that in the owner-
controlled firms, CEOs tend to focus on sales, 
profit and stock return to increase their wealth. 
CONCLUSION 
This study examines the relationship 
between firm performance and CEO 
compensation and hypothesizes that the 
conflict of interest problem exists in 
management-controlled firms, while in owner-
controlled firms, the problem do not exist. The 
results of this study support the two 
hypotheses. 
In management-controlled firms, sales and 
profit performance measures are the 
determinant of CEO compensation. Increasing 
sales or profit does not always increase the 
wealth of the shareholders. But, increasing 
stock returns does increase the wealth of the 
shareholders. Therefore, increasing stock 
returns is consistent with the objective of 
shareholders. Since CEO compensation is 
positively related to sales and profit, it can be 
concluded that in management-controlled 
firms, the conflict of interest between CEO and 
shareholders still exists. 
In owner-controlled firms, all performance 
measures, sales, profit and stock returns, are 
the determinant of CEO compensation. Since 
increasing stock returns does increase the 
wealth of the shareholders, it therefore can be 
concluded that in owner-controlled firms, the 
conflict of interest between CEO and 
shareholders does not exist. 
The results of this study suggest several 
things. First, even though CEOs have been 
compensated, the conflict of interest problem 
still exists in the management-controlled firms. 
Second, ownership plays a key role in 
overcoming the conflict of interest problem. 
Third, executive compensation must be 
designed not only to answer how much CEOs 
have to be paid but rather how they are paid. 
They should be paid in form of stock options 
or corporate stocks to increase their ownership 
in the firm. The results also show that the 
majority of the U.S. firms in the sample are 
aware of this problem and they solved the 
problem by increasing their managers’ 
ownership. As seen in the sample that more 
than 80% of the 300 firms, that are 374 firms 
are owner-controlled firms. 
This study has several limitations. The first 
limitation is the data used. This study only uses 
one year period of data. The second limitation 
of this study is the definition of the 
compensation, which is defined as total 
compensations received by the CEO. Future 
studies should decompose the total 
compensation into long-term and short –term 
compensations. By segregating into short- and 
long-term components of the total 
compensation, future studies can examine not 
only the conflict of interest problem, but also 
the horizon problem. The horizon problem 
occurs if managers emphasize only on the 
short term performance in the expense of long-
term performance.  
2001 Ratnaningsih & Hartono 
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